

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
DECEMBER 1966

WARSAW PACT MILITARY THREAT

DIA DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE

SUMMARY

The attached figures on the Pact's capability are drawn mainly from the McCloy Trilateral Papers on that subject. The intelligence basis in the Trilateral Papers is almost identical with that in the current NATO intelligence estimate, SG 161/20, and in current US national intelligence.

As this year's accepted intelligence basis for NATO military planning, SG 161/20 was approved by the three former Standing Group nations; next year's, MC 161/67, will require approval by all 13 Military Committee nations.

The Military Committee will distribute a recent internationally agreed military intelligence appreciation at the Ministerial Meeting. This estimate discusses general trends; it does not conflict with statistical evaluations of the threat to NATO in Europe.

FACTS/DISCUSSION

Attachment A compares Warsaw Pact force levels in last May's SG 161/20 with more current US intelligence. Attachment B describes both US and Trilateral assessments of the threat to the Central Region under various assumed situations, pointing out differences in conclusions where they exist. In brief the situations are:

--Scenario 1 - Strategic nuclear surprise followed by up to 50 divisions and 3100 tactical aircraft.

--Scenario 2 - Planned non-nuclear attack without buildup by up to 46 divisions and 3600 aircraft initially.

--Scenario 3 - Non-nuclear attack without buildup, arising from miscalculation, by up to 35 divisions and 2200 aircraft initially.

--Scenario 4 - Non-nuclear attack after mobilization and buildup by 60 divisions, with 20 in reserve, and some 4000 aircraft.

--Scenario 5 - Surprise non-nuclear attack with limited objectives by up to 20 Soviet or up to 9 East European divisions and no more than 800 aircraft.

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RECOMMENDATION

It should be noted that:

There is essential agreement on current force levels, but differences arise over the timing and scale of various assumed attack situations.

Neither the latest US data nor the still incomplete Trilateral findings are as widely known and accepted throughout the Alliance as the established estimate, SG 161/20.

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COMPARISON OF US AND NATO ESTIMATES

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	US Estimates <u>December 66</u>
STRENGTH OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES	3,200,000
STRENGTH OF OTHER PACT FORCES	895,000
GROUND FORCES	
Soviet Line Div	141(109) <u>1</u>
Other Pact Line Div	62(42) <u>1</u>
SOVIET NAVAL FORCES	
Operational Submarines	382
Cruisers	18
Destroyers and Escorts	199
Ballistic Missile Submarines	45
Cruise Missile Submarines	48
Guided Missile Patrol Boats	158
SOVIET AIR FORCES	
Air Defense (PVO) Fighters	3580
Heavy Bombers (LRA)	210
Medium Bombers (LRA)	755
Tactical Fighters and Lt Bombers	3250 <u>2</u>
Naval Bombers	580
OTHER PACT AIR FORCES (FIGHTERS & LT BOMBERS)	2475
SOVIET STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES	
ICBM Launch Pads	350
IRBM/MRBM Launch Pads	710
WARSAW PACT FORCES AVAILABLE AGAINST ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE (ACE)	
Category I & II Soviet Line Div	88
Other Pact Line Div available for early commitment	42
LRA (Medium Bombers Only)	About 600
Soviet Tactical Fighters & Lt Bombers	2900
Other Pact Fighters & Lt Bombers	2475
IRBM/MRBM	About 90% of total

1/ Numbers in parentheses represent Category I (manned at 75% or better) and Category II (manned at 60-75%) Soviet divisions and other Pact divisions available for early commitment.

2/ There are also some 500 older combat-type aircraft colocated with units of Tactical Aviation; additionally, over 2,000 older fighters and light bombers are believed to be in reserve status (active storage).

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SUMMARY OF TRILATERAL ASSESSMENTS

1. Primary factors in determining the threat against NATO are:
 - a. Available forces are those in European USSR and Eastern Europe.
 - b. The Soviet main effort would be against the Central Region.
 - c. Size of forces committed would depend on current deployments, readiness, plans for surprise, urgency, geography, size of opposition, and prospects for nuclear or nonnuclear war.
2. Forces available for early use against the Central Region are:

SOVIET CATEGORY I AND II DIVISIONS

<u>Location</u>	<u>MRD</u>		<u>TANK</u>		<u>AIRBORNE</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>Cat I</u>	<u>Cat II</u>	<u>Cat I</u>	<u>Cat II</u>	<u>Cat I</u>	<u>Cat II</u>	
East Germany (GSFG)	10	0	10	0	0	0	20
Poland (NGF)	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Hungary (SGF)	2	0	2	0	0	0	4
Western USSR	9	5	11	6	2	1	34
Kiev MD	0	2	1	3	0	0	6
TOTAL	21	7	26	9	2	1	66

EAST EUROPEAN DIVISIONS READY FOR EARLY COMMITMENT

	<u>Mechanized</u>	<u>Armored</u>	<u>Total</u>
East Germany	4	2	6
Poland	4	5	9
Czechoslovakia	4	5	9
Hungary	2	1	3
TOTAL	14	13	27

SOVIET TACTICAL AVIATION

	<u>Ftrs</u>	<u>L. Bmbrs</u>	<u>Recce</u>	<u>Total</u>
East Germany	575	120	96	791
Poland	222	0	60	282
Hungary	160	56	0	216
Western MDs	722	106	138	966
TOTAL	1679	282	294	2255

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EAST EUROPEAN AIR FORCES

	<u>Ftrs</u>	<u>L. Bmbrs</u>	<u>Recce</u>	<u>Total</u>
East Germany	300	0	0	300
Poland	769	52	64	885
Hungary	132	0	0	132
Czechoslovakia	<u>530</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>91</u>	<u>621</u>
TOTAL	1731	52	155	1938

3. The following are the scenarios developed by the Tripartite group and the forces considered to be initially available for each situation. Although the ground and air forces are lumped together geographically, it should be recognized that the numbers of aircraft shown, as well as additional aircraft from the USSR, could be employed more flexibly than the breakdowns indicate.

a. Surprise Nuclear Attack -- occurs without preparation of general purpose forces, following surprise strategic attack, and seeks to exploit the chaos.

	<u>US POSITION</u> 25X1		
	<u>Divisions</u>	<u>Manpower</u> (000)	<u>Tactical</u> <u>Aircraft</u>
Soviet	26	355	1289
East Germany	6	67	300
Polish	9	92	885
Czechoslovakia	<u>9</u>	<u>92</u>	<u>621</u>
TOTAL	50	606	3095

b. Non-Nuclear (Surprise) Attack without Mobilization (Deliberate) -- Movement of reinforcements from Western USSR would take place after the start of hostilities and would be subject to NATO interdiction. (In this case and also in the following case of Non-Nuclear Attack without Mobilization (Miscalculation) the US found it necessary to qualify the availability of 20 Category I Soviet divisions listed by the UK and FRG as "USSR reinforcement," because they are located at considerable distances from the Central Region. Their use would require time to assemble divisions from separate and widely scattered field armies and to deploy forward. The Army and front support units for these divisions are well below wartime requirements. Even the forces in the forward area have deficiencies in command and control and in combat and service support, necessitating substantial deployments of units and personnel from the Soviet Union. Additionally, Soviet Forces in Hungary do not have rapid access to the Central Region because of limitations in the transportation system, and would require about as much time for commitment against the Central Region as would an equivalent force from the USSR.)

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25X1

US POSITION

	<u>Divisions</u>	<u>Manpower</u> <u>(000)</u>	<u>Tactical</u> <u>Aircraft</u>
Soviet	22	305	1289
East Germany	6	67	300
Polish	9	92	885
Czechoslovakia	9	92	621
TOTAL	46	556	3095

Soviet Reinforcements

USSR (Not available for
SGF initial phase)

TOTAL

c. Non-Nuclear Attack without Mobilization (Miscalculation) -- War begins without deliberate preparations on either side. Movement of reinforcements occurs only after the start of hostilities and is subject to NATO interdiction.

US POSITION

25X1

	<u>Divisions</u>	<u>Manpower</u> <u>(000)</u>	<u>Tactical</u> <u>Aircraft</u>
Soviet	20	280	1289
East Germany	6	67	300
Czechoslovakia	9	92	621
TOTAL	35	439	2210

Soviet Reinforcements

USSR
NGF (Not available for
SGF initial phase)

Polish Reinforcements
TOTAL

d. Non-Nuclear Attack with Mobilization -- launched by conventional forces following some period of tension and a rapid buildup of forces in the forward area. Differences between national positions are based primarily on estimates of time to build up the assumed force: US - 3 to 4 weeks;

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	<u>US POSITION</u>		
	<u>Divisions</u>	<u>Manpower</u> <u>(000)</u>	<u>Tactical</u> <u>Aircraft</u>
Soviet in E. Europe	26	429	1289
Sov Reinforcements	30	507	966
East Germany	6	81	300
Polish	9	121	885
Czechoslovakia	<u>9</u>	<u>121</u>	<u>621</u>
TOTAL	80	1259	4061

e. Surprise Limited Attack with Limited Objectives -- Non-nuclear attack aimed at achieving surprise and designed to attain a specific, short range objective.

	<u>US POSITION</u> 25X1		
	<u>Divisions</u>	<u>Manpower</u> <u>(000)</u>	<u>Tactical</u> <u>Aircraft</u>
USSR (GSFG) OR if a "proxy" attack	Up to 20	Up to 280	Up to 791
East Germany	Up to 6	Up to 67	Up to 300
OR Czechoslovakia	Up to 9	Up to 92	Up to 621

4. In the scenarios shown in paragraph 3 above the figures on divisions and tactical aircraft as shown under the UK/FRG position are the same as in SG 161/20. Manpower figures reflect estimates of division forces (army or front division slices) and are not found in SG 161/20. US figures are based on NIE 11-14-66, dated 3 November 1966.

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